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ABSTRACT
The advent of the digital age has borne a new economic ideology, termed “surveillance
capitalism” by Shoshanna Zuboff, whereby technological corporations extract valuable
behavioral insights from large swaths of user-generated data to amass huge amounts of profit.
This “collateral” data is generated by the user through daily interactions with the internet and is
obtained and processed by corporations either with or without the consent of the user. The
employment of surveillance capitalist logic results in several pernicious harms to both the
individual and the collective. In this thesis, I argue that surveillance capitalism poses specific
threats to freedom, autonomy, and distributive justice. Previous scholarship has conceptualized
the right to data through the lens of privacy. However, I posit that a framework of property rights
may be better suited to address the threats produced by surveillance capitalism. I reference the
landscape of current and future data privacy laws, as well as a broader argument as to the global
nature of cyberspace, to establish that privacy laws in isolation cannot remediate the harms
resulting from surveillance capitalism. Subsequently, this paper makes two crucial arguments:
first, that the injuries wrought by surveillance capitalism are severe enough to necessitate the
designation of the “right to data” as a human right. Referencing the works of John Rawls,
Charles Beitz, and Joseph Raz, I advance the claim that the right to data is justified by the same
normative principles used to justify the existing practice of human rights. The second major
premise indicates that property rights will adequately address surveillance capitalism’s threats to
autonomy, freedom, and distributive justice. In the following sections of the paper, I explore
possible practical manifestations of the property rights framework and consider relevant
objections to the argument.
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Introduction
The notion of a “digital footprint” – digital traces that users leave behind as they surf the
internet or go online – has become relatively commonplace in the 21st century. Individuals sign
away the records of their online behavior on a daily basis, often by absentmindedly clicking
“accept” on an obscure list of terms and conditions or accessing websites that surreptitiously
record their behavior.1 As innocuous as this phenomenon may seem, these human experiences
are digitized and translated into behavioral data for use by corporations. In a process that has
come to be termed as “surveillance capitalism,” technological firms can wield seemingly
insignificant behavioral data to make powerful predictions about human behavior.2
The logic of surveillance capitalism is often construed as a mechanism employed by
internet companies to fine-tune online advertising, largely in the name of accurately targeting
personalized advertisements to consumers. However, in recent years, this phenomenon has
accelerated far beyond the realm of targeted advertising. The 2018 Cambridge Analytica case
demonstrates that surveillance capitalism can actually shift human behavior to affect political
outcomes and obstruct the democratic process.3 This is just one example of the detrimental
harms resulting from surveillance capitalism; recent research has shown that companies can
synthesize insights gleaned from user behavior on the internet to determine credit scores and
eligibility for premium insurance policies.4 These instances illustrate some of the negative

1

“DIGITAL FOOTPRINT (Noun).” In Macmillan Dictionary. Accessed December 8, 2021.
https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/digital-footprint.
2
Shoshanna Zuboff. The Age of Surveillance Capitalism. (New York City: PublicAffairs Books, 2018), 18
3
Alex Hern, “Cambridge Analytica: How Did It Turn Clicks into Votes?” The Guardian, May 6, 2018, sec. News,
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/may/06/cambridge-analytica-how-turn-clicks-into-votes-christopherwylie.
4
Robert H. Sloan and Richard Warner, “Algorithms and Human Freedom,” Santa Clara High Technology Law
Journal 35, no. 4 (March 13, 2019), https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3351960.
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impacts of surveillance capitalism. I will delve into a more detailed description of the precise
harms in Section 2 of this paper.
Given that this process is relatively new, very little legislation is currently in place to
protect individuals from potential harms generated through surveillance capitalist tactics.
Consumers virtually have no control over the data they generate, nor do they wield any tactical
power over how their data is used. Zuboff describes the mechanisms through which the exact
process occurs, claiming that the collateral behavioral data generated by users from interacting
with the internet, i.e., “data exhaust,"5 is converted by companies into specific “prediction
products”6 that are used to predict (and possibly shape) user behavior. There are two key
processes at play here: first, that this behavioral data is often collected surreptitiously or without
user knowledge. Second, even with the presence of terms and conditions and “opt-out” functions,
users frequently relinquish their privacy rights over data without second thought.
While existing approaches to the regulation of surveillance capitalism typically focus on
bolstering user privacy, in this thesis, I will make an argument for a framework of property rights
over the raw data exhaust that users generate. Importantly, I do not intend to justify user
ownership over the prediction products that companies generate from user data. Rather, I intend
to establish a right to the collateral data that users generate through interfacing with the internet
in myriad ways: whether it be from surfing the web, using social media, or wearing a trackable
activity device. More specifically, I intend to claim that this right to data (as I will refer to it)
should be institutionalized within the international human rights practice.
After delving into the history of surveillance capitalism in Section 1, I will detail its
precise harms to both the self and society, including threats to autonomy, freedom, and

5
6

Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 110.
Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 18.
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distributive justice. I will then specify why the right to data is already encompassed by the
existing breadth of human rights regimes. To do so, I will utilize one of the two philosophical
lenses that are commonly associated with the justification for human rights: the “political
conception,” which argues that the nature of human rights is best understood by their current,
distinct role in international political practice. Lastly, I will examine why a framework of “data
as property” may serve as appropriate redress for the harms produced by surveillance capitalism
and explore practical manifestations of this framework.

Section 1: Historical Origins of the Internet and Data Collection
Leonard Kleinrock published the first paper on “packet switching theory,” a globally
interconnected set of computers that transferred data in packets for efficiency. 7 Concurrently, the
first large scale packet-switching network, ARPANET, was built by the Advanced Research
Projects Agency (ARPA) in 1969.8 A product of the U.S Department of Defense’s research
initiatives, the ARPANET computer network linked more than 50 government agencies and
universities all over the United States.9 This instigated the creation of several other packetswitching networks, like the packet radio system PRNET and the satellite communications
network SATNET.10
To effectively connect different heterogeneous networks, Vinton Cerf and Robert Kahn
designed the TCP/IP, or the “Internet Protocol,” which was formally adopted by every host site
on each network by 1983.11 Throughout the mid-80s and the 90s, the National Science

Barry M Leiner, Robert E Kahn, and Jon Postel. “A Brief History of the Internet.” ACM SIGCOMM Computer
Communication Review 39, no. 5 (October 2009): 23, https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/1629607.1629613
8
See above.
9
Abbate, Janet. Inventing the Internet. Inside Technology.(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999)
10
John Naughton, “The Evolution of the Internet: From Military Experiment to General Purpose Technology.”
Journal of Cyber Policy 1, no. 1 (May 2016): 5–28, https://doi.org/10.1080/23738871.2016.1157619.
11
Abbate, Inventing the Internet.
7
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Foundation (NSF) funded a series of supercomputing centers around the United States, forming
the NSFNET network that would become the backbone of the “civilian network.” 12 Following
the decommission of ARPANET in 1990, the internet was privatized by Internet Service
Providers (ISPs), expanding network access to laypeople. Around the same time, the scientist Sir
Tim Berners-Lee created the “WorldWideWeb,” the internet’s first web browser and editor,
using pre-established hypertext software. This development set the stage for the first “Internet
Boom” in the 90s.13
In the spring of 1993, Eric Bina and Marc Andreessen released “Mosaic,” the first web
browser that displayed graphics inline. Mosaic precipitated a surge in the demand for internet
connections among the general public, triggering several other companies to begin offering
commercial browsers and search engines.14 Among these search engines was Google, a startup
founded by Larry Page and Sergey Brins in the wake of Mosaic’s success. As users began
engaging with the web through Google’s services, these computer mediated activities produced
large swaths of data.
Every Google search query would create an abundance of collateral information, like the
“number and pattern of search terms, how a query is phrased, spelling, punctuation, dwell times,
click patterns, and location.”15 Upon realizing that these data could provide valuable insights into
user behavior, Google’s engineers grasped that they could use this flow of collateral information
to turn the search engine into a “recursive learning system.”16 Zuboff refers to this as the
“behavioral value reinvestment cycle,” a process by which behavioral data from the user was

Naughton, “The Evolution of the Internet.”
See above.
14
Abbate, Inventing the Internet.
15
Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 114.
16
Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism,115.
12
13
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reinvested in the user’s internet experience with the purpose of generating an improved search
engine.17
Nevertheless, this reinvestment into users was short-lived. When the dot-com bubble
crashed in 2000, Google searched for a way to annul the crisis by responding to investors’
anxieties. Google tasked its seven member AdWords team with the objective of finding more
ways to make money – they quickly learned that they could mine behavioral data to specifically
match ads to users’ interests. In short, the raw behavioral data that had originally been reinvested
in optimizing users’ experience was redirected towards predicting user behavior.18 Key to this
was the compilation of data sets called “UPIs” – user profile information – that were created and
analyzed from a user’s search patterns.19 This process was so successful in generating revenue
that Google eventually extended the model beyond their search pages, rendering the internet a
canvas for targeted advertisements.
In academia, scholars identify this extraction of user data in different ways. Viktor
Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier refer to the initial stages of creating collateral user data
as “datafication” – unearthing data from material that was previously considered unimportant. 20
Crucially, datafication is distinct from “digitization,” the process of converting analog
information into the zeros and ones of binary code for computers, because it involves enlarging
the observations captured from an initial data set by expanding the confines of the data set itself.
However, the actual logic of capitalizing on this dataset to generate profit is better known as

17

Zuboff. The Age of Surveillance Capitalism,117.
Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 115.
19
Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 132.
20
Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, and Kenneth Cukier. Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How We Live,
Work, and Think (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013), 165.
18
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“surveillance capitalism,” a term first coined by Shoshanna Zuboff in 2014.21 To describe the
mechanics of surveillance capitalism, I will appropriate some of Zuboff’s key terms. Data that is
originally generated for product or service improvement is declared “proprietary behavioral
surplus,” which insinuates that the behavioral surplus is a product owned and trademarked by the
respective companies through which the surplus is generated.22 This behavioral surplus is fed
into advanced “machine intelligence” processes, eventually becoming “prediction products that
will anticipate what you will do now, soon, and later.”23
Google’s employment of surveillance capitalist practices soon provoked a vast array of
competitors from every sector: gradually establishing surveillance capitalism as the default
model of information capitalism on the web.24 When Google went public in 2004 and revealed
their financial results to the world, Silicon Valley investors became aware of the elusive business
model of surveillance capitalism that solidified the company’s success. Four years later, Mark
Zuckerberg embarked on a quest to apply Google’s logic and techniques to the Facebook
platform by hiring former Google Executive Sheryl Sandberg. Under Sandberg’s direction,
Facebook would learn to not only generate behavioral surplus, but also to effectively create
demand for advertiser’s products by deliberately inviting advertisers into Facebook’s online
culture.25
In part, surveillance capitalism treats data as a capital asset – a piece of property expected
to generate value over time. 26 This conception has proved to be highly profitable to large

John Laidler. “Harvard Professor Says Surveillance Capitalism Is Undermining Democracy,” Harvard Gazette
(blog), March 4, 2019, https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2019/03/harvard-professor-says-surveillancecapitalism-is-undermining-democracy/.
22
Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 20.
23
Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 19.
24
Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 155.
25
Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 154.
26
“The Rise of Data Capital.” MIT Technology Review Custom, 2016.
https://www.technologyreview.com/2016/03/21/161487/the-rise-of-data-capital/.
21
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corporations. For example, Amazon’s targeted advertisement system is valued at a staggering
$125 billion.27 This valuation is because Amazon’s database remediates some of the guesswork
present in Google or Facebook’s behavioral database by having direct access to consumer’s
delivery addresses, shopping history, and credit card information. Furthermore, in 2016, 89% of
the revenues of Google’s parent company “Alphabet” was derived from Google’s targeted
advertising programs.28 Notably, corporations profit off user data without providing any
compensation to the users themselves.
A clearer example of Facebook’s behavioral modification was revealed in 2017 through
leaked documents obtained by the Australian. Essentially, Facebook monitored post, pictures,
interactions, and internet activity to pinpoint the precise emotional states of young people at
different points in the day. From this information, Facebook could determine when a younger
person was most “vulnerable to a specific configuration of subliminal cues and triggers.”29 This
data was then used to match emotional phases with messaging that guaranteed the maximum
probability of sales, thus capitalizing on user’s emotions to manipulate their actions.
However, Zuboff argues that this process is problematic on an even more insidious level.
Beyond the extraction of behavioral data, surveillance capitalists’ interests have shifted from
knowing about behavior to using machine-learning processes to shape it. Since surveillance
capitalism is fundamentally an economic process, it can be described in phases of competitive
intensity, or the extent to which corporations in the same industry can exert influence over one
another and their profits. At the peak of this competitive intensity, extracting behavioral insights
Karen Weise, “Amazon Knows What You Buy. And It’s Building a Big Ad Business From It,” The New York
Times, January 20, 2019, sec, Technology, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/20/technology/amazon-adsadvertising.html.
28
Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 149.
29
Sam Levin, “Facebook Told Advertisers It Can Identify Teens Feeling ‘Insecure’ and ‘Worthless,’” The
Guardian, May 1, 2017, sec. Technology, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/01/facebookadvertising-data-insecure-teens.
27
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is insufficient in assuring a competitive edge. Instead, surveillance capitalists turn to means of
behavioral modification, using machine processes to tacitly shape individual, group, and
population behavior.
This phenomenon is perhaps best exemplified by Facebook’s 2012 study, “A 61-millionperson experiment in social influence and political mobilization.” Facebook reported that
randomly delivered political mobilization messages to Facebook users during the 2010 US
congressional election sent an estimated 60,000 additional voters to the polls and delivered
280,000 others who cast votes due to a “social contagion” effect.30 These results provide insight
as to how surveillance capitalists can leverage their influence to modify and change human
behavior.

Section 2: Clarifying the Harms Produced by Surveillance Capitalism
What is the exact issue with surveillance capitalism? While the potential ramifications
and harms to individuals may seem relatively obvious, scholars disagree in their exact
identification of the problem. In the following section, I intend to outline the harms surveillance
capitalism poses to individual autonomy, freedom, and distributive justice.
Here, I will note that the logic of surveillance capitalism yields products like personalized
content and an individualized user experience, which may be considered beneficial to users.
Furthermore, some users actively desire this individualized experience; a survey conducted by
Epsilon and GBH Insights of 1,000 American respondents found that 80% want personalization
from retailers.31 It could also be argued that corporations’ profits from surveillance capitalism

Robert M. Bond et al., “A 61-Million-Person Experiment in Social Influence and Political Mobilization,” Nature
489, no. 7415 (September 2012): 295–98, https://doi.org/10.1038/nature11421.
31
Erik Lindecrantz, Madeleine Tjon Pian Gi, and Stefano Zerbi, “Personalized Experience for Customers: Driving
Differentiation in Retail | McKinsey,” McKinsey & Company, April 28, 2020,
30
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have yielded indirect economic benefits. For instance, Google’s search and advertising tools
have helped provide $426 billions in productive economic activity.32 However, these profits are
achieved at the cost of several important harms that cannot be dismissed.
In Section 5D of this paper, I will detail a possible implementation of my proposed
framework that will allow for targeted, personalized content (and associated profits), without
resulting in the same negative repercussions to autonomy, freedom, and justice. Given that there
is a way to achieve an individualized user experience and productive economic activity without
incurring the negative ramifications, I contend that the positive outcomes of surveillance
capitalism do not eliminate the need for potential remedies. Even if a detractor of this argument
were to disagree my proposed solution, I will make the case that the harms posed by surveillance
capitalism necessitate some sort of solution that still allows for the constructive benefits to
flourish. To this end, I will proceed with an analysis of the possible threats of this practice.
Section 2A: The Threat to Autonomy
Richard Herschel and Virginia M. Miori highlight a variety of broad ethical implications
to do with “Big Data,” a nebulous phenomenon that they define as the process of “capturing,
storing, sharing, evaluating and acting upon information that humans and devices create and
distribute using computer-based technologies and networks.”33 Big Data, in conjunction with
algorithms and machine learning, forms the crux of surveillance capitalism. It is important to
note that it is not Big Data itself that is problematic, rather, it is the way in which Big Data is

https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/retail/our-insights/personalizing-the-customer-experience-drivingdifferentiation-in-retail.
32
“Google Economic Impact,” Google, accessed November 12, 2020,
https://economicimpact.google.com/introduction/.
33
Richard Herschel and Virginia M. Miori, “Ethics & Big Data,” Technology in Society, no. 49 (May 2017): 31–36,
https://doi.org/10.1038/nature11421.6/5/2022 3:50:00 PM
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employed that generates harm. Since a number of academic scholars have written about the
ethical nature of Big Data, I will refer to their analysis insofar as it applies to the specific practice
of surveillance capitalism, while using the term Big Data when discussing their original articles.
Herschel and Miori discuss Big Data in the context of four broad ethical perspectives.
First, they claim that Big Data fundamentally challenges the ethical standard represented by the
Kantian viewpoint: namely, that one should always respect the autonomy of other people,
treating them as ends in themselves as opposed to treating individuals as mere means to an end.34
Under Kant’s definition, the “autonomy of the will” is “the property of the will by which it is a
law to itself independent of any property of the objects of volition.” In layman terms, a person is
“autonomous only if his choices and actions are unaffected by factors that are external, or
inessential to himself,” where the “external factors” are heavily contingent on situation and
context.35
Under this definition, I argue that since surveillance capitalism heavily relies on the
surreptitious collection and analysis of data without user consent, an individual’s ability to make
choices that are “unaffected by inessential factors” is challenged. Surveillance capitalism’s
tactics of distilling individuals down to data points, marketing to assumed preferences, and
shaping consumer behavior constitute “external or internal factors” that interfere with free will
by attempting to predict and modify human behavior. For an example of specific behavioral
modification, see the preceding section discussing Facebook’s targeting of specific mood points
to shape consumer preferences, which demonstrates how surveillance capitalism constitutes an
external factor that influences consumer preferences.

Herschel and Miori, “Ethics & Big Data.”
Taylor, J. Stacey, "Autonomy." Encyclopedia Britannica, June 20, 2017.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/autonomy.
34
35
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Even in cases where individuals are given the chance to “opt-out” of surveillance
capitalist tactics, people often fall victim to “euphemisms of consent,” a term I will discuss in
greater detail at a later point in this paper. Briefly, the personal autonomy offered by terms and
conditions contracts and opt-in/opt-out options is a guise, because individuals often sign their
rights away without further thought. Also, because there is no practical mechanism through
which users can monitor where their information is going, individuals are often unaware of the
extent to which their data is being shared. This is a clear violation of the autonomy prioritized by
Kantian ethics, because surveillance capitalism assumes a user’s consent to data collection and
impinges on their free will through behavioral manipulation.
A similar conclusion can be reached without relying on a distinctively Kantian
conception of autonomy. Sofia Grafanaki adopts the broader view that autonomy concerns not
just a person’s actions, but also the independence and authenticity of the desires (like values and
emotions) that instigate them to act in the first place.36 Autonomy, then, is conceived of in two
stages: an exploration phase where an individual develops the capacity and ability for choice
(i.e.: individual self-determination), and a second stage where an individual applies their own
original thoughts and conceptions to a specific act or decision. On this view, surveillance
capitalism undermines autonomy by threatening the exploration phase.37
The extraction of behavioral data and creation of user profiles often determines what
choices an individual will be given online. These choices can be relatively trivial, such as a user
receiving ads for only certain types of products, but they can also be more harmful, like selective
marketing for housing, insurance, credit decisions or career opportunities. This selective

Sofia Grafanaki, “Autonomy Challenges in the Age of Big Data,” Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and
Entertainment Law Journal 27, no. 4 (May 2017): 810, https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol27/iss4/3
37
See above.
36

17

marketing discriminates between users based on the behavioral data collected from them. In this
sense, the machine learning processes employed by surveillance capitalism can create “selffulfilling prophecies,” wherein the data being used to make predictions about an individual are
themselves being used to shape their behavior. As such, since predictions are not independent of
an individual’s eventual decisions, such machine learning processes diminish an individual’s
capacity for choice.
Interestingly, Grafanaki also highlights what she terms “Orwellian concerns,” with
regards to the effects of surveillance capitalism on the second stage of autonomy.38A Pew
Research report found that writers, globally, are overwhelmingly worried about mass
surveillance and engaging in self-censorship. Another report found that the Edward Snowden
revelations have amplified concerns about data surveillance, thus limiting expression and
exploration at the personal level online.39 This argument echoes Foucault’s metaphor of the
“panopticon,” where the threat of continuous surveillance drives people to modulate their
behavior.40 Though these concerns are largely to do with governmental, rather than corporate,
surveillance, the key principle can be extrapolated to surveillance capitalism. The unmonitored
surveillance of online behavior interferes with an individual’s ability for self-determination and
expression on the internet.41

Grafanaki, “Autonomy Challenges,” 817.
“Global Chilling: The Impact of Mass Surveillance on International Writers.” PEN American Center, January 5,
2015, https://pen.org/research-resources/global-chilling/.
40
Michel Foucault, “‘Panopticism’ from ‘Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison,’” Race/Ethnicity:
Multidisciplinary Global Contexts 2, no. 1 (2008): 1–12, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25594995
41
There is disagreement as to this specific claim, as some research claims that individuals now resign themselves to
hyper-visibility rather than actively engaging in self-censorship. See Grafanaki’s article for more information.
38
39
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Section 2B: The Threat to Freedom
Surveillance capitalism also provokes concerns regarding freedom, more often referred to
as liberty. Liberty is a multifaceted concept. The most famous distinction between types of
liberty is Isaiah Berlin’s concept of positive and negative liberty. Positive liberty is labeled as
“self-mastery,” or the ability to be in control of one’s life in being self-directed and
autonomous.42 Negative liberty refers to a “freedom from interference, coercion, or restraint”
from other people and entities.43
There is much academic debate about the applicability of these two concepts. Some
scholars, such as Gerald MacCallum, have even suggested that the dichotomy between positive
and negative liberty is a false one and that there are instead a range of possible interpretations of
“freedom.”44 For the purposes of my argument, I will utilize Amartya Sen’s definition of
freedom, which involves not just the absence of certain social forces, but also the presence of
certain capabilities. This view does not necessarily fall under Berlin’s original conception of
positive liberty, despite bearing some similarity to the self mastery argument. I have chosen to
use this particular conception of freedom because it holds a certain degree of multicultural value
in being applicable to a wide range of cultures, an argument which I will explain in Section 2D.
Capabilities, according to Sen, are defined as the “real freedoms that people have to
achieve their potential doings and beings.”45 In this sense, real freedom constitutes having the

Ian Carter, “Positive and Negative Liberty,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta,
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means necessary to achieving potential doings or beings rather than exclusively focusing on the
formal freedom to do or be something. Sen’s analysis concludes that the appropriate space to
assess human equality and advantage is through the capabilities they have “reason to value.”46
However, his original formulation of the capabilities approach does not specify which
capabilities people should have reason to value. His view does not tell us which freedoms are
relevant and should be considered fundamental as opposed to other wants and needs. Martha
Nussbaum’s extension of Sen’s argument assumes a set of universal values, allowing her to
specify a list of ten central capabilities that may not be compromised.
Given the range of epistemological concerns that arise because of committing to any
central list of human capabilities, I will avoid resorting to Nussbaum’s universal list of
capabilities, and instead adhere to Sen’s original argument.47 Sen distinguishes between the
capability to achieve functioning relevant to one’s being (“the well-being aspect”) and the
capability to pursue goals other than the pursuit of one’s well-being (“the agency aspect”).48 The
well-being aspect involves a vector of functionings that are constitutive of a person’s being,
including elementary functions such as being well-nourished and avoiding escapable mortality as
well as more complex pursuits like community involvement and self-respect.49 The capability to
achieve such functions essential to well-being is what constitutes substantive freedom.
Concomitantly, an individual’s capability to gain achievements that they value (but that may not
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necessarily contribute to their well-being in the way the well-being aspect involves) constitutes
their agency freedom.50
I will now turn to an examination of how surveillance capitalism interferes with an
individual’s capability to achieve their well-being. I posit that surveillance capitalism interferes
with capabilities through the synthesis of “broad-based predictions.”51 Robert Sloan and Richard
Warner use this term to describe how insights obtained from virtually any area of one’s online
presence, through algorithms and machine learning processes, can inform vital components of
their future. These insights can contribute to a person’s insurance policies, employment
opportunities, and even credit scores. This is a phenomenon I will detail further in the succeeding
section on distributive justice. Nevertheless, with regards to credit scores, Rob Aitken describes
how “alternative data” that includes social networking patterns can contribute to the
formalization of credit scores for those without credit records or files (a group of people he calls
the “unbanked”).52
To situate this example within the context of surveillance capitalism, the data exhaust
generated from social networking activity (in conjunction with other alternative data) is put
through algorithmic processes that yield predictive products which determine an individual’s
credit score. Given that credit scores are hugely significant in determining financial status, this
example illustrates how surveillance capitalism can interfere with an individual’s capability to
take out loans, have insurance, and obtain employment. In modern society, these functions are
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inevitably associated with well-being; therefore, this example illustrates how surveillance
capitalism may interfere with an individual’s capability to achieve well-being.
Another instance of surveillance capitalism infringing on capabilities occurs in the
context of freedom of speech, spirit, and opinion. The capability for speech, spirit and opinion
may not be integral to well-being, but it is a function that many have reason to value, Thus, we
might consider it to be encompassed by Sen’s agency aspect. While there are variances in global
attitudes, a Pew Research Center survey found that a majority of people in 38 countries polled
(including the U.S, Latin America, Europe, Asia, the Middle East and Africa) consider the
freedom of expression to be important.53
The synthesis of prediction products leads to consumer personalization, which exposes
users to the same sorts of views, beliefs, and decisions that have been gleaned from their original
user profile. According to Henrik Sætra, this propagation of mimetic ideas leads to a
“narrowing” of the world we perceive, creating “algorithm-based filter bubbles.”54 Surveillance
capitalism limits the capability for freedom of expression and opinion by perpetuating “bubbles”
with like-minded spirit and opinions through algorithmic filters. This argument is echoed by
Janneke Gerard, who claims that the internet and online presences are indispensable to the
freedom of expression and the access to information.55 In narrowing the wealth of information
available to users based on predictive products about their tastes, the logic of surveillance
capitalism limits the capability for individuals to partake in freedom of expression.
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Sætra also argues that the compilation of UPIs designed to make us purchase specific
products and services, click on news stories, vote, and pay taxes comprises “nudges” that
interfere with the agency aspect. This manipulation threatens the capability to explore all our
possible pursuits by limiting the set of decisions available to us.56 Of course, it could be argued
that this manipulation exists on an even more basic level through marketing techniques and
political campaigns.
I contend that surveillance capitalism’s tactics constitute a clearer interference because
of the opacity shrouding its tactics. Gerard uses the analogy of “black boxes” to refer to
algorithms, implying that the sheer complexity and independence of the machine learning
processes employed in surveillance capitalism leave users unaware of how they are being
targeted or manipulated.57 Users are generally aware of the persuasive intention behind
marketing and campaigns, and can thus make their decisions with a certain degree of
independence from this sort of interference. In the case of surveillance capitalism, the
interference often occurs surreptitiously, leaving users little room to critically evaluate their
decision-making process. This was also the case in the previously mentioned example of
Facebook tracking mood changes to inform advertising tactics (see Introduction). Therefore,
surveillance capitalism threatens the capabilities that individuals have reason to value,
specifically, the capabilities for well-being and agency.
Section 2C: The Threat to Distributive Justice
Lastly, surveillance capitalism harms social well-being by perpetuating distributive
injustices. The primary concern that I will outline is the effect of surveillance capitalism on
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distributive justice. The exact effect that surveillance capitalism has on distributive justice is that
it perpetuates unjust status inequalities. I take for granted that these unjust inequalities are
harmful to society; whether these unjust inequalities constitute a sufficient harm to society is a
debate that I will not broach. I will also not engage in a detailed description of the varying
principles of distributive of justice; rather, I will focus on the theory of “equality of opportunity.”
The endorsement of some form of equality of opportunity is prevalent among distributive
justice theorists.58 Equality of opportunity requires that inequalities permitted by the general
theory are only justified if people have the necessary kinds of opportunities to achieve greater or
lesser amounts of goods.59 Manovich argues that surveillance capitalism encroaches on equality
of opportunity by dividing society into three “data-classes:” those who create data, those who
collect data, and those who can analyze data.60 The resultant data-class status hierarchy renders
the first group – those who create data – subject to classification and profiling.
Since the logic of surveillance capitalism involves classifying individuals based on
shared traits derived from data, algorithms can purposefully be designed to enable firms to
engage in illegal forms of discrimination. For instance, while there is existing legislation
outlawing discriminatory practices in the real estate industry, companies utilize Big Data models
to identify and avoid advertising to potential property renters based on their racial background or
socio-demographic status. These potential renters are identified through algorithms that sift
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through “discrete online activity,” such as “liking things on Facebook.”61 This example
illustrates one of the most pernicious issues to do with surveillance capitalism: the “injustice of
misrecognition” that creates unequal opportunities to access economic and social goods,
eventually perpetuating unjust status inequalities.62
Furthermore, as alluded to in Section 2B, the new alternative data industry used in
determining credit scores also exemplifies the injustices perpetuated by surveillance capitalism.
Credit scores directly affect the opportunities afforded to individuals by determining financial
and material circumstances in society. However, beyond the issues to do with capabilities, the
logic of surveillance capitalism results in the production of inaccurate credit scores. Under
surveillance capitalism, alternative data is used to contribute to these credit scores, however this
alternative data often consists of the “vagaries of online identity” that can produce serious
inaccuracies. 63
This discussion of credit scores illuminates the severity of this issue: individuals may be
unable to secure a loan, mortgage, or health insurance due to an incorrect assessment of their risk
based on irrelevant data. In other words, surveillance capitalism often mischaracterizes and
misrecognizes individuals to the point of limiting their opportunities in society. One could argue
that addressing the algorithms to improve their accuracy might be the appropriate solution here.
However, unlike the traditional mechanisms for determining credit scores, the logic of
surveillance capitalism allows no mechanism for disputes or redress when mistakes occur. In this
sense, the misrecognition of individuals can cause serious harms because there is no concrete
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way to address disputes. Individuals are afforded unequal access to opportunities based on
inaccurate algorithms with no opportunity for resolution.
Section 2D: On the universality of autonomy, freedom and distributive justice.
Finally, I will consider whether surveillance capitalism constitutes a global harm. That is,
are the tenets of autonomy, freedom and distributive justice valued cross-culturally such that a
violation of these harms would be problematic on an international scale? I will answer this
question on a case by case basis – arguing how each autonomy, freedom, and distributive justice
all possess some degree of universal value.
To make an argument for the universality of autonomy as I have defined it, I will refer to
Simon Caney’s argument for the universalism of certain values. Caney makes the case that
certain morals that have universal form (in that the same principles apply) and universal scope
(in that these principles apply to all). He justifies this using an argument he calls “The General
Argument,” an argument predicated on two key premises:
1. The moral principles that apply to some persons apply to all persons who share some
common morally relevant properties.
2. That people around the world share morally relevant similarities.64
Caney elaborates a defense of the second premise by arguing that persons throughout the world
have common needs and vulnerabilities (i.e.: require food and shelter to survive, susceptible to
disease) and common goods (i.e.: life, bodily health). I will not delve into a defense of Caney’s
central assumption, rather, I will consider his subsequent claim: based on these universal moral
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values, there are universal principles of civil and political justice, the right to autonomy being
among them.
One of the justifications of universal civil and political rights, termed the “well-being
argument,” is that such rights are necessary for human beings to flourish. Caney contends that
the claim for agency as a right essential to human well-being is a “familiar one,” specifying
agency as “being in charge of one’s own life and making one’s own decisions.”65 Though Caney
refers to this property as agency, I would argue that the language used to describe agency bears
strong similarity to my earlier discussion of autonomy; especially as the emphasis on “making
one’s own decisions” seems analogous to making one’s own choices without external
interference, and to Grafanaki’s definition of autonomy as self-determination and independent
decision-making.
While one might think that agency is a parochial western value, Caney emphasizes that
the universality of such a value can be found in a multitude of non-western cultures: Buddhists,
for instance, strongly emphasize the need for individuals to acquire independence through their
own reflection and action. Furthermore, Ghanaian philosophers like Kwame Gyeke and Kwasi
Wiredu argue that some African traditions of thought also stress the value of individuality and
independence.66 There is also evidence for moral autonomy in other non-western, less
individualistic societies – Joseph Chan makes the argument that there is a conception of moral
autonomy in Confucian (the grounding philosophy of Chinese government and society) ethics
that supports, to a certain degree, the independence of choice and actions from external factors or
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coercion.67 This literature tells us that there is good reason to think that autonomy, to some
degree, is a universal value that holds weight across different cultures.
In a similar vein, can we consider the claim that individuals should have the freedoms to
pursue the capabilities they value as being universally accepted? It is significant to note that the
epistemological intent behind Sen’s theory already imbues the notion of capabilities with some
degree of cross-cultural value. Sen developed this approach “in order to identify a space in which
we can make cross-cultural judgments on the quality of life.”68 The capability approach takes
account of human diversity in around three ways, two of which are relevant to my discussion.
This approach encompasses a wide-range of dimensions in conceptualizations of wellbeing and distinguishes well-being freedom from agency freedom, allowing for a diversity of
activities to be encompassed under capabilities.69 It is therefore plausible that cross-cultural
variances in what constitutes well-being may be accounted for under this theory. Similarly, the
inclusion of agency freedom allows for pursuits that are not be integral to well-being to be
considered under the capabilities approach. Therefore, even if different countries define wellbeing in various ways, a pursuit that does not fall under well-being may still be considered
essential to a person’s substantive freedom.
The capabilities definition of freedom, therefore, allows for universal and cross-cultural
validity. One might be concerned with the limitations surveillance capitalism places on specific
capabilities, and ask whether those specific capabilities are considered universal. I contend that
the capability to take out loans, to have employment, and to be insured are ones that are valued in
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most nations (exempting perhaps indigenous tribes). Furthermore, the evidence for freedom of
expression being valued to some degree globally (see Section 2B) substantiates the claim that
this capability is somewhat universally valued. There will of course be variations as to the extent
that different nations value capabilities, but for the sake of my argument, it is sufficient to
establish that the capabilities approach holds basic universal value, and that surveillance
capitalism threatens certain capabilities that are valued transnationally.
Lastly, how might we establish distributive justice, or more specifically, the equality of
opportunity as a universal value? Gillian Brock writes that “the ideal of fair equality of
opportunity is widely endorsed as a central commitment within liberal democracies.”70 But what
about nations or communities that are not liberal democracies? I confess that in illiberal
democracies (such as Singapore or China) or authoritarian regimes (like Saudia Arabia), there is
not much evidence to suggest that these nations give normative weight to the equality of
opportunity (at least with regards to political organization and societal distribution). That being
said, as Caney argues, we should not conflate the views of the political elite with their peoples.71
It is possible that citizens of such countries might value equality of opportunity even if it is not
central to their society’s organization. This is entirely a speculative claim, and requires more
investigation on citizens attitudes towards specific liberal tenets within countries that do not
identify as liberal democracies.
Additionally, there is research that demonstrates elements of egalitarianism and equality
of opportunity in Confucianism.72 There is also academic research theorizing egalitarian
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elements and a general conception of the fundamental equality of all persons in Islamic texts.73
While this body of literature vaguely gestures at the normative value of equality (I would not go
so far as to contend that the exact interpretation of equality of opportunity as I have presented it
appears verbatim), there is no overwhelming evidence to indicate that equality of opportunity is
valued at the international level. This is a valid objection to my argument; however, I will
continue to refer to surveillance capitalism’s threats to distributive justice, because I assume that
these harms would be unacceptable to the numerous nations that are liberal democracies or value
equality of opportunity.

Section 3: Exploring Current Conceptions of Data Ownership and Privacy
Having established the basic tenets of this practice, and outlining the possible harms and
threats to users, I now seek to answer the question: what is currently being done to mitigate the
negative impacts of surveillance capitalism? First, it is necessary to define the scope of
protections being examined, i.e., should we look to domestic or international law? I will establish
that it is necessary to look at international laws and regimes, largely because the internet and
associated “cyberspace” often transcends national borders.
Section 3A: Justifying Data Protections at the International Level
Zuboff’s scholarship specifically focuses on the practices of Google, Facebook, and
Microsoft: corporations she identifies as being firmly embedded in the logic of surveillance
capitalism.74 While she mentions that Amazon is migrating towards surveillance capitalist
tactics, and that Apple has, as of 2018, drawn the line, these corporations are not included in her
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analysis.75 Nevertheless, the three corporations she analyzes are all multinational and operate in a
number of territories around the world; Google alone has operations in 219 countries.76 This
indicates that an international framework may be well poised to address harms generated by
firms engaging in surveillance capitalism. Moreover, the internet consists of “cyberspace,” an
amorphous “virtual” world created by the components of the Internet’s infrastructure.77 Security
experts consider cyberspace to be part of the “global commons,” a region outside the territorial
jurisdiction of any state, much like the high seas, airspace and outer space.78 The physical
structure of cyberspace, which includes computer servers, cables, and other equipment, is also
dispersed across the planet. So, the nature of cyberspace necessitates an examination of
international regulations.
Of course, it is possible for states to tightly regulate the internet at the domestic level;
countries like China, Vietnam, and Burma/Myanmar exemplify this.79 Without endorsing the
restrictive elements of the systems themselves, these examples substantiate the claim that states
can control the internet within their territory. However, the presence of international regulation
increases the possibility for cross-territorial claims of data breaches, which may be uniquely
relevant to addressing the harms generated by surveillance capitalism. Jonathan Cinnamon notes
that “the territoriality of personal data accumulation means that if you live outside of the data
center’s political jurisdiction, it is likely that a foreign entity is controlling your data, which
means that you’ll be severely restricted from making a justice claim regarding access, the ways
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your data are used or how it represents you.”80 Domestic laws in isolation would be unable to
address such supranational claims. To provide an overarching sense of domestic data protection
policies, I will outline generalized models that exist amidst different countries but will refrain
from providing a piecemeal analysis specific to each region.
Section 3B: Surveying the Landscape of Data Privacy
Currently, most of the legal discourse surrounding the effects of surveillance capitalism is
firmly entrenched in a discussion of privacy. Modern conceptions of the right to privacy often
draw inspiration from Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states:
“No one should be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks on his honour or reputation. Everyone has the right to the
protection of the law against such interferences or attacks.”81
According to David Banisar and Simon Davies, the interest in the right to data privacy increased
in the 1960s and 70s, around the same time ARPANET and Internet-based technologies were
taking off.82
The first data protection law in the world was enacted in Germany in 1970; throughout
this decade, similar national laws were enacted in other parts of the Western world including
Sweden, the United States, Germany, and France.83 From this legislation, two crucial
international instruments evolved. First, the Council of Europe’s (COE) 1981 “Convention for
the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Automatic Processing of Personal Data,” which
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has been adopted by over 20 countries and signed by another 6 nations. The second is the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) “Guidelines Governing the
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Data Flows of Personal Data,” which has been referenced
in the national legislation of non-OECD countries.84 Banisar and Davies posit that the content of
these two documents form the backbone of the data protection laws in dozens of countries.
Generally speaking, the declaration and laws across varying countries require that personal
information must be:
● Obtained fairly and lawfully
● Used only for the original specified purpose
● Adequate, relevant, and not excessive to purpose.
● Accurate and up to date.
● Accessible to the subject.
● Kept secure, and
● Destroyed after its purpose is completed.85
Additionally, Banisar and Davies’ survey of international privacy models identifies four
broad classes of privacy protection:
1. Comprehensive laws: In regions like Europe, countries have a general data protection law
that oversees the collection, use, and dissemination of personal information in the public
and private sectors. Most of these countries have appointed an official or agency to
oversee enforcement. However, the powers of enforcement vary greatly by country and
can be affected by resource limitations.
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2. Sectoral laws: In lieu of general data protection rules, countries like the United States
have specific sectoral laws. Enforcement is achieved through a wide range of tactics. This
approach necessitates that new legislation be introduced with every new technology,
which leads to gaps in existing laws.
3. Self-regulation: Countries like Japan and Singapore allow companies and industry bodies
to self-regulate by establishing codes of practice. Due to inadequacy in these industry
codes and no enforcement power, this approach falls short of the data protection laws in
other countries.
4. Technologies of privacy: Users of the internet and other physical applications employ
programs and systems that ensure data privacy, such as encryption, anonymous remailers,
and proxy servers.86
Despite the presence of data privacy laws at an international and regional level, the wide
variations in established approaches and efficacy leaves significant lacunae in protections that
surveillance capitalism can seep through. These gaps persist even in regions that are moving
towards stronger data protection laws.
Some countries are taking steps to match the burgeoning threat that surveillance
capitalism poses. In December 2020, the European Commission proposed the Digital Services
Act and the Digital Markets Act, putting forward a comprehensive set of new rules for online
platforms that operate in the European Union.87 The proposals were created with an
acknowledgement of the newer mechanisms and tactics employed by tech giants to gather and
repurpose data, and are therefore perhaps uniquely situated to address surveillance capitalism’s
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threats.88 Specifically, the DMA aims to fill the current gaps in the GDPR (EU General Data
Protection Regulation) in addressing data-collection. Depending on how it is enacted, the DMA
could limit the granularity and comprehensiveness of datasets or UPIs compiled by firms like
Facebook and Google.89 Specifically, Article 5(a) prohibits “gatekeepers,” (online platforms with
at least 45 million monthly active users) from “combining personal data,” without the active
consent of end-users, limiting platforms’ ability to build UPIs.90
Broadly speaking, the DMA prioritizes transparency objectives in behavioral data
collection and advertising, rather than focusing on the regulation of this data collection. This is
problematic, because “transparency” often involves privacy policies, terms-of-service
agreements, and other informative endeavors that users regularly bypass. An empirical study of
privacy policy and terms of service reading behavior found that 74% of users skipped reading the
policies and opted for the “quick-join” clickwrap to save valuable time.91
This phenomenon sheds light on a larger issue with data privacy laws: typically, these
regulations can be circumvented through an offering of a “contract,” that users blithely accept.
Zuboff refers to these contracts as “euphemisms of consent,” because users typically accept them
without any critical thought, and furthermore, because surveillance capitalist rendition tactics
transcend the conventions of “opting in” and “opting out.”92 Since surveillance capitalist
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practices overtly flaunt existing regulations and can bypass very progressive iterations of privacy
law, there is a need for a different approach to combating surveillance capitalist tactics.

Section 4: Justifying the Right to Data as a Human Right
I will now defend the following central claim: that the issue of surveillance capitalism
can be better remediated by establishing that an individual’s right to the data they generate
should be encompassed by the human right to property. There are two thresholds to this
argument: first, I must establish that the right to data should be a human right. This premise is
not specific to property; rather, I intend to establish that either through privacy or property, every
individual has a “human right to data.” To do so, I will utilize the institutional lens of human
rights to describe how the right to data should be encompassed by the larger body of human
rights, referencing the works of John Rawls, Charles Beitz, and Joseph Raz.
The second threshold is establishing that data should be conceived of, at least in part, as
property. Since I am utilizing the right to data as a means of mitigation for surveillance
capitalism, I will argue that construing data as property addresses the previously established
harms from surveillance capitalism (see Section 2). At this point, I will address relevant
objections, namely the suggestion that user-generated data would be better protected by a regime
of privacy rather than a property rights framework. In the following analysis, I will use the term
“data” to broadly reference the digital exhaust I referenced in Section 1, that is, the collateral
data generated by a user while interacting with the internet before it is put through machine
learning processes to create the “prediction products” that companies use to target consumers.
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Section 4A: Grounding the Political Conception Argument for Human Rights
The “political conception” argument functions as answers to the question “What are
human rights?” and “What makes them distinct from other rights?” If I can establish that the
right to data meets the conditions set forward by the political conception theory, then I can argue
that it is fundamentally a human right. To make this claim, I will first briefly describe the
distinction between the naturalistic and political conception of human rights. The naturalistic
conception of human rights draws from the writings of Hugo Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf and
John Locke. This conception holds that human rights are “rights that all human beings possess
simply in virtue of their humanity, and which can be identified simply by the use of ordinary
moral reasoning [natural reason].”93 Evidently, the naturalistic argument is grounded in morality,
because it presupposes that these rights are “pre-legal,” and arise independently of the state.
However, works by contemporary philosophers such as John Rawls, Charles Beitz, and
Joseph Raz gave significant impulse to an alternative view: the political conception of human
rights. Advocates of this conception generally argue that the distinct nature of human rights is
conveyed through their role or function in modern international political practice. However, there
are varying interpretations of the conditions necessitated by the political conception. While the
views espoused by Rawls, Beitz and Raz share many commonalities, I also will highlight the
non-overlapping conditions between these views. Subsequently, if I can demonstrate that the
human right to data meets both the common and unique (to each view) conditions for the
political conception, I will have established that there is a human right to data at a more rigorous
level that would be achieved by adhering to just one of these views.
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Rawls claims that human rights are a “special class of rights designed to play a special
role in a reasonable law of peoples for the present age.”94 He was interested in a narrow set of
international human rights that were defined by the role they played in clarifying other
normative concepts, such as the legitimacy of a regime and its legal order, sovereignty, the
permissible grounds for intervention, and the limits to moral pluralism. Since Rawls’ original
paper, his claim has been reiterated and extended by several scholars.
This includes Charles Beitz who posits a broader “practical conception” of human rights.
Beitz expresses that human rights are not solely defined by the narrow roles Rawls prescribed,
but rather encompass guiding practical judgements about international responsibility or
concern.95 Beitz specifies that human rights are rights whose object is to “protect urgent
individual interests against certain predictable dangers to which they are vulnerable under typical
circumstances of life in a modern world order composed of states.”96 In a similar vein, Joseph
Raz’s account of human rights expands the definition to include rights that can be held against
international agents and organizations of all sorts, not just states.97
Raz also highlights that in the context of human rights, the limits of sovereignty cannot
be conflated with the limits of legitimate authority. At this point, I will highlight a key difference
between Rawls and Raz’s arguments, primarily to establish that Raz suggests a more stringent
standard for the justifiability of intervention. In the subsequent analysis, I will use Raz’s standard
to bolster the strength of my argument. Both Rawls and Raz agree that human rights are rights

John Rawls, “The Law of Peoples,” Critical Inquiry 20, no. 1 (Autumn 1993): 58,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1343947.
95
Charles R. Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009),
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199572458.001.0001.
96
Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights, 109.
97
Joseph Raz, “Human Rights Without Foundations,” Oxford Legal Studies Research (January 2007),
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1491.
94

38

that effectively “disable” a state’s sovereignty. This means that if a state violates human rights,
and another state chooses to interfere, the original state cannot invoke sovereignty as a defense.
However, Rawls’ original account claims that human rights are “necessary conditions of any
system of social-cooperation,” where social cooperation is a “productive and socially
coordinated activity” that yields mutual advantages to all the parties involved.98
On the other hand, Raz contests the association between the conditions of social
cooperation and the limits of sovereignty. According to Raz, the scope of a state’s authority
cannot be curtailed by the degree to which a state is internally acting in a “socially cooperative”
manner, because the moral principles which govern social relations and a society’s structure
varies across communities. A state’s internal political order may not live up to Rawlsian
standards for social cooperation, but this does not mean that this state is in violation of human
rights and requires external intervention.
A synthesis of these scholar’s viewpoints can be constructed in the following way:
1: Human Rights are a special class of rights designed to play a special role in international law.
2: Rights are human rights when their fulfillment is a necessary condition of the legitimacy of a
regime and the decency of its legal order, and when they set limits to moral pluralism. Moral
pluralism can be thought of as a diversity of moral viewpoints that cannot be reconciled with
another but all possess validity.99 Therefore, a human right must constrain this pluralism by
reinforcing a moral doctrine that is not up for debate.
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3: Rights are human rights when violations of these rights provide permissible grounds for
intervention and disable the boundaries of state sovereignty.
4: The moral limits of state sovereignty are not determined by the internal social cooperation of a
political order, but also depend on the justifiability of interference by others.
5: The broad mandate or object of human rights is to “protect urgent individual interests against
certain predictable dangers to which they are vulnerable under typical circumstances of life in a
modern world order composed of states.”100
Importantly, in adhering to the political conception argument, I am not attempting to
claim that an individual’s right to data is morally justified as a human right. Rather, I contend
that based on an interpretation of the normative principles underlying the international human
rights practice as we know it, there is a set of conditions that define what a human right is.
According to the political conception, then, an adequate theory of human rights will be grounded
in an interpretation of the current practice of human rights.
This might lead to the following sort of concern: I may have established that there is a
human right to data by satisfying the criteria set forth by an interpretation of the current human
rights practice, but there is nothing intrinsically special about the human rights practice. If the
practices of the existing human rights practice were to change, so would the principles flowing
from it, therefore invalidating my entire analysis. Since I cannot normatively justify the human
right to data, and can only justify it in terms of the existing human rights corpus and associated
principles, one might consider the practice based conception to be weak grounds for my
argument for the human right to data.
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To address the concern that there is nothing intrinsically special about the human rights
practice, I will briefly digress into Ronald Dworkin’s account of “constructive interpretation.”101
Dworkin originally synthesized his theory of constructive interpretation in reaction to positivist
conceptions of law, however, I refer to his argument as it applies to my analysis. He proposes
two assumptions about existing practices: first, that a practice does not simply exist, but has
some intrinsic value in serving some interest or enforcing a principle that exists separate to the
practice itself. Second, that the practice as it exists now does not necessarily per se serve the
underlying interest, purpose, or principle, and thus can be interpreted differently.102
Under this constructivist account, the issue with the practice-based justification is
resolved. This is because we can assume that the human rights practices in place serve some
intrinsic value or enforce a set of principles that are entirely distinct to the practice itself. For
instance, we could posit that the specific human right of freedom from torture is valuable in
ensuring some overarching principle of treating humans with dignity or kindness. In connection
to my argument, we might think that if the existing human rights practice affirms some
overarching value of granting individuals autonomy or equality, then the human right to data
would ultimately serve that pre-existing intrinsic value.
Importantly, as Andrea Sangiovanni points out, these “first principles” aren’t affirmed as
self-evident, their justification ultimately “flows from their place in the whole picture.”103
Furthermore, the second principle allows us to understand why a political conception of human
rights does not justify whatever the actual practices happen to be. These actual practices are
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ultimately responsive to principles that are imminent in them, but they need not necessarily live
up to these principles. Therefore, a constructive interpretation of a practice provides room for the
criticism of existing practices, while still allowing us to justify human rights using the political
conception.
Section 4B: Establishing the Right to Data as a Human Right
Having broadly synthesized differing accounts of the political conception, I now intend to
show that an individual’s right to data meets the non-overlapping criterion established by these
different theories. The initial three criteria stem from Rawlsian theory. While Joseph Raz accepts
the first three basic assumptions, he contests Rawls’ claim that intervention stems from internal
social cooperation and provides a more specific requirement about the justifiability of
interference.104
Raz’s disagreement with Rawls is the basis for the fourth criterion mentioned in Section
4A. So, at this stage, I will address this disagreement and demonstrate that the right to data meets
Raz’s more stringent justifiability of interference condition. Lastly, I will discuss the fifth
criterion, which comes from Beitz’s argument. Beitz accepts Rawls’ general principles, but
argues that his approach is too narrow. He characterizes human rights as addressing “dangers” to
the common individual – this discussion will lead us into the next section, where I argue that
classifying data as property is the appropriate form of redress for these dangers.105
Given that the first point is a general point about the nature of human rights, I will
proceed with an analysis of the second criterion. First, I need to establish that the right to
individual data is a necessary condition of the legitimacy of a regime and the decency of a legal
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order. Here, the analysis of political legitimacy becomes slightly convoluted because political
legitimacy is often defined by the exercise of civil and political rights by citizens that justify
political authority. A perceptive reader will note that given my earlier reliance on legitimacy to
explain human rights, turning now to rights to explain legitimacy may result in a circular
argument. However, to continue appealing to the framework I have established, I will have to
reference Rawls’ own definition of political legitimacy. Therefore, while this argument may
seem circular, I contend that the circularity is virtuous in that it allows for cohesion with the preestablished framework.
In the following section, I will be using Rawls’ definition of political legitimacy because
the criterion pertaining to political legitimacy is from Rawls’ work. According to Silje A.
Langvatn, Rawls provides several characterizations of political legitimacy:
1. Legitimacy requires both sufficient procedural justice and sufficient outcome
justice. Procedural justice refers to the justice of the procedure that determines
how benefits and burdens are allocated to individuals, while outcome justice
refers to the justice of the final allocation itself.106
2. Legitimacy connects to the pedigree of those who have political authority and a
law or institution came about i.e. whether political officials, laws, and institutions
came into office/arose in accordance with established rules and traditions.107
Rawls’ characterization of legitimacy also distinguishes between justice and legitimacy: a
law may be just in that it produces fair outcomes, but may be politically illegitimate because the
law has been created in a process that is not sufficiently just. Furthermore, he differentiates
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between “the legitimacy of political institutions and the legitimacy of decisions and as enacted
pursuant to them; and also between accepting a constitution as legitimate and accepting as
legitimate a particular statute or decision in accordance with the constitution.”108 An important
caveat is that this perception of political legitimacy would not account for monarchical,
authoritarian, or overly corrupt governments where outcome or procedural justice would not be
of much concern.
When users do not have rights to their data, as is the status quo under surveillance
capitalism, political legitimacy as characterized by Rawls may be undermined. First, surveillance
capitalism threatens to disrupt the outcome justice of decisions enacted by political institutions.
As mentioned in Section 2C, surveillance capitalism can result in unfair outcomes by allowing
real-estate companies to bypass anti-discrimination laws established by the legislature.
There is also evidence of surveillance capitalism concretely affecting the process through
which political officials come into office, evidenced by the highly publicized Cambridge
Analytica case. The now-defunct political data organization, in collaboration with Facebook,
illicitly collected the data of millions of people to influence voting choices during the 2016 U.S
Presidential Campaign and the 2016 Brexit referendum.109 As such, the U.S Presidential Office
and Brexit referendum did not arise in accordance with established rules and traditions –
specifically, the established traditions that are relevant to a fair democratic process.
Regarding the second part of this criterion, we must now turn to whether the right to
one’s data sets limits to moral pluralism. Rawls contextualizes moral pluralism by describing
human rights as of “universal application'' and “hardly controversial in their general
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intention.”110 In this sense, he claims, they specify the “outer boundary of admissible domestic
law.”111 This specific condition was conceived in part as an answer to the cross-cultural validity
argument that is often used by detractors of the international human rights regime, because it
defines human rights as being the product of consensus between cultures rather than arising
primarily from a Western conception of morality. For the sake of our argument, we must
consider whether the right to data is hardly controversial in its general intention, and whether this
right may be applied universally. I postulate that the sheer existence of transnational internet
privacy laws (see Section 3B) indicates that the individual right to data is somewhat globally
accepted, even if the actual efficacy of these laws is questionable.
The new European legislation on the horizon (see Section 3B) also indicates a growing
consensus on establishing rights over personal data generated on the internet. The emergence of
increasingly stringent data protections laws is not restricted to Western nations: on August 20,
2021, the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress promulgated the Chinese
Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL) which aims to “protect the rights and interest of
individuals,” “regulate personal information processing activities,” and “facilitate reasonable use
of personal information.”112
Furthermore, in June 2014, the African Union (AU) adopted the AU Convention on
Cybersecurity and Data Protection, which recognizes the “urgent need to establish a mechanism
to address the dangers and risks deriving from the use of electronic data and individual records,
with a view to respecting privacy and freedoms.”113 Article 8 of this convention states that the
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established objective of the convention shall “ensure that any form of data processing respects
the fundamental freedoms and rights of natural persons.”114 Though this convention has not yet
been ratified by 15 out of the 54 AU member jurisdiction, it provides a data protection
framework which might be reflected in national legislations across Africa, and also substantiates
an emerging global recognition of the need for rights to personal data. 115
With regards to public opinion itself, though there is a lack of cross-cultural studies that
examine public perception of personal data, an empirical study of participants from Germany,
Great Britain, and the United States found that respondents overwhelmingly object to the
collection and use of sensitive personal information and to the personalization of political
campaigning.116 An important reservation here is that academic studies typically frame the right
to data as a negative right (the right to not have data collected) rather than the right to individual
data itself; the impact of question framing in this context is not a question I will address, but one
that requires more attention. A possible objection to this argument is that the global disparities in
access to the Internet or technology (i.e: “the digital divide”) undermines the global applicability
of the right to data. However, if states are moving towards improved technological access, as is
indicated by a 2018 UN General Assembly Resolution, then it is fair to assume that the right to
individual data may soon become a universal issue. 117
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Next, we must address whether a violation of the right to data is justified grounds for
international intervention. Importantly, I note that by “intervention” I do not imply armed or
militaristic styles of intervention; rather, as I will establish in the subsequent paragraph using
Beitz’s argument, I take “intervention” to include a broader range of non-coercive political and
economic measures. The very nature of surveillance capitalist logic and the structure of the
corporations that deploy these tactics necessitates international intervention. As discussed in
Section 3A, the internet often transcends sovereign boundaries, as do the operations of several
major internet-based corporations.
Cyberspace is explicitly recognized as part of a region known as the international
commons, as such, any regulations or rights over the products generated in cyberspace must exist
both within and outside state borders. For instance, activist Max Schrems took legal action
against Facebook Ireland when it was discovered that the company was exporting data to its USbased parent company.118 This case highlights how data and behavioral insights may be exported
or transferred internationally, which is why the right to data must be established at a level
superseding sovereign boundaries.
An objection to this argument might take the following form: if the United States has
established that corporations can mine and collect behavioral data, through a lack of explicit
regulations or laws, would the presence of a right to individual data be grounds for another
country to intervene? The thought here is that the United States’ violation of the right to data is
not sufficient grounds for external intervention. This objection bears strong similarity to Raz’s
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primary concern with Rawl’s theory of human rights, in that a State can exceed its legitimate
authority (or violate its “internal social cooperation”) without justifying external intervention.
As a means of responding to the aforementioned objection, and addressing the fourth
criterion, I will now discuss the justifiability of interference condition. Raz’s notion of justifiable
interference is a more stringent standard for human rights than Rawls’ original condition, which
simply holds that a human right must justify disabling boundaries of state sovereignty. I am
introducing this specific argument from Raz to suggest that even if held to Raz’s more rigorous
standard, the right to data is still justified. Raz posits that a state’s right to non-interference is not
solely dependent on its internal social cooperation, rather, it is also contingent on the
justifiability of interference itself. With respect to the aforementioned objection, the individual
right to data would not provide justifiable grounds for external interference.
However, the right to data would surely provide grounds for specific external
intervention. If the United States was allowing corporations to mine and extract the behavioral
data of citizens of the United Kingdom, then the right to data would provide reasonable grounds
for the United Kingdom to intervene. Furthermore, as Beitz suggests, there is a broad range of
non-coercive political and economic measures that could constitute intervention – as such, the
role of human rights need not be solely restricted to the pro tanto justification of foreign
interference.119 With regards to the hypothetical scenario, the United States actions’ may be
grounds for sanctions or official rebuke even if they are not subject to armed intervention.
The fifth and last premise is based on Beitz’s broader conception of the role of human
rights. Beitz implies a set of guiding practical judgements about international responsibility or
concern, namely, protecting individuals against certain typical dangers that are commonplace in
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a modern world made up of States. Therefore, the question that needs to be answered is whether
the right to data protects individuals against certain typical, commonplace dangers. As previously
established, surveillance capitalism poses a multitude of dangers to the common individual, and
due to the nature of cyberspace, is a distinctively international matter of concern. Hence, the
individual right to data to their own data generated meets the general criterion and definitions for
what constitutes a human right.

Section 5: Justifying the Right to Data Under a Property Framework
In Section 4B, I established that the right to data, in some shape or form, should
constitute a human right under the political conception of human rights. Now, I will advance the
argument that the right to data should take the form of a property right. I will begin by explaining
the pre-existing basis for property rights within the human rights corpus in Section 5A. This
explanation will subvert the need to justify the inclusion of property rights within the human
rights practice.
In the following subsection, I will relate why data should be encompassed by property
rights. This analysis will first provide a definition of property and explain how data may be
accounted for by this definition. To justify the application of property rights to data, I will refer
to Section 2 and discuss whether defining data as property can appropriately mitigate the harms
from surveillance capitalism. I will also outline other extraneous benefits of classifying data as
property. In the succeeding section, I will respond to relevant objections.
Section 5A: The Pre-Existing Right to Property in the Human Rights Corpus
The right to property is already enshrined in the human rights corpus. To provide some
historical context, the 1648 Peace of Westphalia treaties created the modern state-system and
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largely ended any conception of a global regime of property law.120 Under this model, property
rights were to be governed nationally through the domestic laws of particular states. This model
contrasted with prevailing “natural law” theory, expounded by continental European scholars
such as Grotius and Pufendorf, that emphasized the “universal right” of “private ownership.”121
Under natural law theory, the state was created to protect pre-existing property rights. Within the
common law system, John Locke was the foremost champion of the natural law approach to
property.
Eventually, in 1765, William Blackstone would write the Commentaries on the laws of
England which identified the right to property as one of three “absolute” rights in English law.122
Domestically, Natural Law theory became increasingly popular in America and France during
the late eighteenth century, and was wielded as a political tool during their respective
revolutions.123 However, it wasn’t until the mid-20th century and the formation of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights that the discourse around property rights shifted.124
Following the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany during the second world war,
nations sought to establish international norms to clearly define the relationship between states
and their nationals.125 These norms were expressed as inalienable, fundamental, “human rights”
that would be inviolable by all member parties. While there is a discernible connection between
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the intent behind the creation of human rights and the natural law tradition, academic debate as
to the exact philosophical nature of human rights persists. 126
Regardless of the exact philosophical background for the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the right to property was first placed in Article 17 of the UDHR:
1.

Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with
others.

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.127
Article 17 was groundbreaking in that it moved property away from the state’s purview and
vested it directly in the individual. Under this model, private citizens could assert property
against their own state. However, due to dissension from the Soviet Bloc and other nations, this
article was rejected, and a diluted version was instituted instead.128
1. The states parties to this Covenant undertake to respect the right of everyone to own
property alone as well as in association with others. This right shall be subject to such
limitations and restrictions as are imposed by law in the public interest and in the interest
of social progress in the country concerned.
2. No one shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. Expropriation may
take place only for considerations of public necessity or utility as defined by law and
subject to such compensation as may be prescribed.129
Nevertheless, over the last 40 years, property law has become irrevocably encoded in the
body of regional human rights law. Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights
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(ECHR) states that “everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property” and
furthermore that “no one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just
compensation…”130 The ECHR is currently in force in 47 states, including the Russian
Federation and other former Socialist states in Eastern Europe that rejected Article 17 in the
original draft of the UDHR.131
Further examples include the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR),
which claims that “the right to property shall be guaranteed” and “may only be encroached upon
in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community.”132 Article 21 of
American Convention of Human Rights (ACHR) notes that “everyone has the right to the use
and enjoyment of his property.”133 These three conventions have enforcement power through
established tribunals that are capable of hearing individual complaints.
In the Middle East and Asia, there are similar proclamations of the human right to
property: Article 31 of the Arab Charter mentions that “everyone has a guaranteed right to own
private property.”134 The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration affirms that “every person has the
right to own, use, dispose of and give that person’s lawfully acquired possessions alone or in
association with others.”135 While the Arab Charter and ASEAN Declaration are nonbinding
legal instruments, their declaration of property as a human right wields normative power.136
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In summary, a total of 132 states (over two-thirds of the entire UN membership) are
party to binding human rights conventions that explicitly recognize the right to property.137
Importantly, while human rights hold a peremptory position among international law norms,
there are still a substantial number of countries (including China, India, and the United States)
that are not part of human rights conventions recognizing the right to property.138 Nevertheless,
the right to property is encoded within a large subset of human rights laws and regulations.
Section 5B: Defining Property
The key premise, and perhaps the most challenging one, is establishing that right to data
should be conceived of in terms of property. The first difficulty is finding a concrete definition of
property with transnational/cross-cultural applications. Modern conceptions of property rarely
adhere to the traditional, Blackstonian concept of the “sole and despotic dominion in which one
man claims and exercises over the external things of the world.”139 The more common definition,
influenced by Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld and Anthony Maurice Honoré, addresses property as a
“bundle of rights” as prescribed by the state.140 However, these theories largely pertain to a
discussion of property in Anglo-American law and therefore cannot be generalized to the
international sphere. In analyzing the possibility of introducing property rights to data in the EU,
Ivan Stepanov uses David Lametti’s definition of property.141
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“Private property is a social institution that comprises a variety of contextual
relationships among individuals through objects of social wealth and is meant to serve a
variety of individual and collective purposes. It is characterized by allocating to
individuals a measure of control over the use and alienation of, some degree of
exclusivity in the enjoyment of, and some measure of obligation to and responsibilities
for scarce and separable objects of social wealth.”142
Similar to Stepanov, I will refer to Lametti’s view of property because it accounts for
several arguments made in this thesis. For one, it accounts for property serving both “individual
and collective” purposes, somewhat reconciling cross-cultural and ideological differences in the
perception of property as serving individual or communal goals. This view also implies that
property is a relation to resources, which better captures the language of data and surveillance
capitalism; after all, the logic of surveillance capitalism involves mining digital exhaust – a
resource generated by users –to synthesize behavioral predictions and eventually move towards
behavioral automation.
Section 5C: Defining Data as Property
First, it is relevant to establish that data is a resource. The American Heritage Dictionary
provides two definitions of resource: “an available supply that can be drawn upon when needed”
and “a means that can be used to advantage.”143 My earlier discussion referred to the data used
by surveillance capitalists as “digital exhaust” “behavioral surplus” or “collateral data.” These
terms fit the general descriptions of a resource. For one, this data is constantly being generated
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by users and fed into machine intelligence processes by corporations – ensuring an “available
supply” –and the subsequently generated prediction products engender millions in profits for
corporations, giving them a tangible advantage. If property is a relation to resources, then an
individual’s relation to data can be understood as their right over this resource. To better
illustrate this, I will provide an example that clarifies between a user’s interaction with the
internet and the data that this interaction generates.
Till now, I have detailed how surveillance capitalism takes place through search engines,
social media and other websites. However, this logic can also function through other
computerized forms of technology that connect to the “cloud” – a form of storage that exists on
the internet instead of a hard drive. In recent years, the promulgation of “wearables” –
computerized clothing or accessories – has allowed sensitive consumer information to be
transmitted to third parties and sold for profit.
A 2014 study by the FTC (Federal Trade Commission) found that twelve different health
and fitness apps transmitted user data to 76 different third parties, including advertisers.144 In
short, the manifestations of the user’s human experiences, like their heartbeat, sleep patterns and
exercise routines, can be digitized and commodified. A user’s heartbeat in and of itself does not
constitute their “property,” however, when it is translated into data, it invariably becomes a
resource and thus an “object of social wealth.” From this vantage point, property rights to data
are generated through the translation of human experiences into data. While I use this example to
more clearly distinguish between the human experience itself (which does not constitute
property) and the rendition of this experience into data – the same principle applies to all forms
of online behavior.
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Section 5D: Examining How the Property Right to Data can Address Surveillance Capitalism’s
Harms
Could establishing property rights to data sufficiently address the harms perpetuated by
surveillance capitalism? As a reminder, surveillance capitalism threatens values of autonomy,
freedom, and distributive justice (see Section 2). With respect to autonomy, property rights
would transfer some measure of control over an individual’s data back to the user themselves.
Conceiving of the “means to an end” argument as a flow that situates users as “means” and
firms’ profits from data-driven analytics as the “end” yields a better understanding of this claim
– users are given a stake in the transition between raw data exhaust and predictive product. The
creation of an “interventionary stage” allows users far more autonomy because it grants them
some agency in what occurs to their data rather than rendering them passive generators of profits
for corporations.
This might sound like a speculative claim, however, there is evidence in behavioral
economics that suggests that people imbue objects that they own with higher value relative to if
they don’t own these objects. Richard Thaler referred to this pattern as the “endowment effect,”
which he describes as “the fact that people often demand much more to give up an object they
are endowed with than they would be willing to pay to acquire it.”145 In 1990, Daniel Kahneman
and his colleagues tested this theory, organizing a market for mugs in which half the subjects
were randomly chosen to be endowed with a mug, and the other half were not endowed with a
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mug.146 Those not endowed with a mug were asked to list their selling price, while those with a
mug were asked to list their buying price.
If preferences were unaffected by the creation of property rights, then selling prices
should be equal to buying prices, and around half the mugs should be traded. Instead, Kahneman
found that the number of trades were lower than expected: sellers demanded more for the mugs
they owned than buyers were willing to pay.147 This study suggests that granting an individual
property rights to an object intensifies the attachment they feel to said object. In the realm of
data, this suggests that the creation of property rights will heighten the attachment an individual
experiences to their data.
With regards to autonomy, rather than seeking to presume the will of the individual,
property rights essentially force an individual to consider what their will is by augmenting the
emotional attachment an individual feels to their data. If users own their data exhaust, they be
more likely to critically evaluate what they want to happen to it. This also prevents the
subversive manipulation of an individual’s will “without consent,” since they are explicitly
forced to consider what their personal will may be at an early stage in the process.
Finally, the endowment theory is considered to be a product of “loss aversion”– a theory
that describes how individuals experience more disutility from losing an object relative to the
utility they experience when they acquire an object.148 I argue that the phenomenon of loss
aversion as it relates to endowment theory will prevent users from trading away their property
rights the same way they sign away their privacy rights. Granting ownership over an object

Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, “Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion,
and Status Quo Bias,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, no. 1 (March 1991): 193–206,
https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.5.1.193.
147
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, “Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem.”
148
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, “Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem.”
146

57

essentially heightens the effects of loss aversion; as such, I postulate that individuals will more
experience more disutility from losing data when they explicitly own it.
Of course, one might argue that privacy protections and the opt-out function also grant
users autonomy by forcing them to consider their personal will. There are two responses to this
objection: first, that empirical evidence already demonstrates that users typically pay little heed
to the privacy contracts offered to them when accessing a website. Nonetheless, this is a
behavioral quirk of humans, one that could easily be circumvented by, for instance, offering optout as the default choice. Under this model, individuals would have to actively choose to opt-in
rather than the opposite. This would entail a “paternalistic” approach – a mechanism by which
an actor’s actions are limited or prohibited on the grounds that it “would be contrary to the
actor’s own welfare.”149
Behavioral research proves that this mechanism could be highly effective; a study by Eric
J. Johnson and Steven Bellman found that when asking participants whether they would like to
be contacted for future surveys, framing the question as “opting out” resulted in 96.3% of
participants agreeing, while only 48.2% agreed to be contacted when the question was framed as
“opting in.”150 The concern here is that a paternalistic approach also limits individual autonomy.
Since this mechanism of redress causes the same form of harm as the issue of surveillance
capitalism itself, default opt-out privacy contracts are less appealing than property frameworks in
this domain. With the property framework, the authority remains squarely with the individual,
offering more autonomy.
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In Section 2B, I also discussed a broader model of autonomy which focused on the two
stages of self-determination and related to self-censorship. Regarding the process of selfdetermination, users could still choose to sign away their property rights and still be on the
receiving end of harmful marketing practices. I contend that any regime actively preventing
selective marketing would have to be intrinsically paternalistic, as it would have to take the
choice for data exhaust being processed out of the user’s hands altogether.
There would certainly have to be other measures or legislation in place to prevent the
negative effects of selective marketing. However, a property rights framework could incentivize
people to ask the right questions and result in individuals more critically evaluating the effects of
signing away something that they own. This could stem from the endowment effects and loss
aversion; people might be less likely to sign away their rights to their data given the intensified
emotional attachment over objects that they own.
A possible concern here is that data, unlike the objects described in the aforementioned
studies, is a tangible object: would the loss aversion and endowment effect still apply to
intangibles? While there is no research detailing the impact of loss aversion or the endowment
effect on data, there is research studying these phenomena on another type of intangible
property: intellectual property rights. In a 2010 study, Christopher J. Buccafusco studied the
effect of assigning property rights over intellectual property amongst 3 groups: creators, owners,
and buyers.151 The creators were asked to write a haiku for a poetry competition, and then asked
to list the lowest price they would accept for the poem. The buyers were each shown one poem
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and asked to list the highest price they were willing to pay. Finally, the owners were assigned the
intellectual property rights the poems, and also asked to list their lowest asking price.
Buccafusco found that that there was no statistically significant gap between the prices
listed by the owners or the creators, however, there was a significant divide between these prices
and the amount the buyers were willing to pay.152 This indicates that the owners, by mere
possession of the property right, valued the intangible object more than the buyers (who did not
possess property rights) did. Therefore, we have good reason to think that even though data is an
intangible object, establishing a property rights regime could inspire similar behavioral effects.
Regarding the second aspect of autonomy (decision-making), property rights could
remediate the possibility of self-censorship because it acts as an assurance that users have a
concrete claim to their data. Psychologically, it could alleviate concerns that their data is being
surreptitiously collected. Instead, users may feel that they have active agency over their data
when interacting with the internet. This is a somewhat conjectural claim, however there is some
generalized theoretical evidence to support this notion.
In a 1998 study, E. Kevin Kelloway, Julian Barling, and Anthony E. Carroll found that
property rights to jobs resulted in positive correlates of perception relevant to an employment
stimulus, such as increased organizational commitment, increased perceptions of control, and
organizational tenure.153 Specifically, property rights to job was associated with a sense of job
security or control over the job. Extrapolating these results to data, we can presume that granting
individuals property rights of data will increase their perception of control over the data, and
possibly even impart a feeling of data security.
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Turning to the second harm associated with surveillance capitalism, could property rights
effectively remediate the limitations placed on capabilities? As I discussed earlier, the creation
of property rights will not necessarily eradicate selective marketing. Similarly, it will not
eliminate the use of “alternative data,” in inhibiting self-determination, nor can it extinguish the
creation of algorithm “filter-bubbles” and the narrowing of the online world altogether. Users
will always have the choice to allow these phenomena to occur by choosing to forfeit their data.
Since property rights may not sufficiently address the harms of surveillance capitalism to
capabilities, there is grounds for a valid objection here.
In response, I refer to the previous discussion of endowment effect and loss aversion, to
hypothesize that a property rights framework could generate more incentive to critically consider
the relinquishment of one’s data. Implying that a person owns their data creates a normative
power of possessiveness that may instigate individuals to critically evaluate whether they want to
give up their data. Given the lacunae in research on property rights over data however, this is still
a speculative claim.
Another theory of human behavior that might validate the argument for data as property
is the “mere ownership effect” proposed by Fritz Heider. Heider proposes that since possessions
are objects associated with the self, perceiving them and making judgments about them is a
social process susceptible to the same self-enhancing biases that affect individual’s perceptions
of themselves.154 This theory was tested by James Beggan in 1992, who found that “people
overvalue an object associated with the self, namely, an owned object.”155 Therefore, given that
individuals give more normative value to objects they own, this could encourage them to
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contemplate relinquishing the rights to data that they own more than they would relative to if
they did not have this ownership claim.
By extension, the property rights framework could encourage individuals to become more
informed about the ramifications of renouncing their data; when the language of property comes
into play, people may be more likely to take the time to research and puzzle out their options
rather than acting on more impulsive whims (as is the case with the opt-in/opt-out option for
privacy). Ultimately, this will be contingent on how the property rights framework takes shape,
and whether it will attach a monetary value to personal data. This is a point I will discuss further
in the next paragraph.
The third harm discussed in Section 2C of this paper details the threats of surveillance
capitalism to distributive justice and equality of opportunity. Once again, the extent to which a
property rights framework could adequately address this concern is dependent on what form it
takes: if monetary compensations are attached to personal data exhaust, then there is a possibility
that the property rights framework could worsen the inequalities perpetuated by surveillance
capitalism. If the property rights framework allows people exchange their data for money, then it
is likely that already disadvantaged individuals will make this choice. For example, individuals
with low credit scores or in financial stress may be more likely to sell their data, which would
allow surveillance capitalist tactics to further discriminate against them when they are searching
for employment or housing.
Perhaps, however, there is an alternative way to look at this issue. Jaron Lanier and E.
Glen Weyl propose a society of “data dignity” – where people will be paid for their data and will
pay for services that require data from others.156 In their envisioned proposal, individuals’
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attention will be guided by their self-defined interests rather than manipulative, targeted
platform. Correspondingly, platforms will receive higher quality data to train their machine
learning systems. Lanier and Weyl hypothesize that the creation of “Mediators of Individual
Data” or MIDS can mediate this market. A MID functions as a sort of union, consisting of a
group of volunteers that represents its online members in a wide range of ways – including the
negotiation of data royalties.157 If property rights were to be attached to financial incentives,
MIDs could offset some of the potential issues to do with distributive justice concerns through
collective bargaining. The class of “those who have data” will be afforded more concentrated
power through the creation of groups dedicated to promoting their interests.
Of course, it is not necessary that property rights take the shape of data dignity at the
human rights level. However, property rights offer the necessary background to create more
specific legislation, either at the domestic or international level, that could advance the concept
of personal data with value. This is largely because property rights, in line with the definition I
offered, conceptualizes data as a resource. Nevertheless, a detailed account of how data as
property could take effect at different levels is beyond the scope of this paper: I merely offer this
proposal as an example of how property rights could theoretically remediate a specific harm
associated with surveillance capitalism.
One worry that might arise here could be the feasibility of an international property
system at present. I agree that institutionalizing an international property scheme for data,
especially one that would allow people to press claims, might be unrealistic at present. But, data
could be encoded as property at the international human rights level, which would not require
establishing an international property system. This classification may inspire normative changes:
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previous research by Beth Simmons has demonstrated that human rights contain extensive
normative power by entrapping countries into “toeing” a line.158
Lastly, there is a more general motivation for classifying data as property. Indisputably,
most Western legal systems are fiercely protective of private property. Though there may be
regional variations in how property is defined, Western legal systems “give great emphasis to the
concept of possession.”159 In Capital and Ideology, Thomas Piketty argues that all political and
property regimes have remained inextricably intertwined in all societal and cultural structures:
from communist and social-democratic societies to modern postcolonial and hyper capitalist
communities.160 There are usually penalties circumscribed in existing legal systems to address
property breaches.
Therefore, there is good reason to think that personal property entitlements to data will
generate claims that are difficult for corporations to dismiss. With respect to cross-cultural
validity, the concept of communal or shared property is more common in Non-Western legal
traditions. As Piketty notes, however, property rights are still “persistently linked” to the
organization of a political regime.161 Given that most societies give property claims a great deal
of weight, it is reasonable to conclude that property entitlements to data will instigate
transnational claims that are difficult to ignore.
Moreover, the designation of data as property at the human rights level could give rise to
more regional legislation on data protection. Simmons discusses how human rights treaties
specifically can change the national policy agenda and enhance the possibility of litigation at the
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supranational level.162 Perhaps the designation of data as property at the human rights level
would create change at a regional scale, bolstering domestic laws to provide even more
protection for internet users. We can imagine that the designation of data as property at the
international scale would give rise to more national legislation, leading to a stronger network of
rules and regulations that protect users from the threats of surveillance capitalism.

Section 6: Objections to the Argument for Data as Property
I will now consider objections specific to classifying data as property. First, one might be
unpersuaded by the claim that classifying data as property is the best way to protect individuals
from the harms discussed in Section 2. Such a skeptic may argue that the best way to protect
users from the threats posed by surveillance capitalism is to ban the rendition of human
experience into data or to stop the generation of this data exhaust in the first place. Essentially,
there must be practices in place that prevent corporations from rendering users’ interactions with
the internet into profitable data points.
This type of detractor would argue that property is the incorrect approach because the
property argument accepts that this data exhaust has been generated in the first place, while an
alternative approach would not cede this point. A skeptic with this view might tout privacy laws
as the best mechanism of achieving this. In response, I claim that this approach may remediate
the harms to distributive justice arising from surveillance capitalism but remains paternalistic in
assuming that users don’t want their experiences rendered into data to begin with. Like the
argument I made in Section 5, assuming the will of any given user is a clear infringement of their
autonomy.
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Furthermore, as I briefly outlined in Section 2, the generation of digital exhaust does
yield some benefits, like personalized content and consumer satisfaction. With respect to targeted
advertising specifically, corporations have generated profits that are beneficial to economies. It is
my view that a property framework, rather than a terminal ban on the generation of this data
altogether, would allow for these benefits to be generated within the constraints imposed by the
values of autonomy, freedom, and distributive justice.
There is also the possibility of a property rights framework, like the one proposed by
Lanier and Weyl, that specifically addresses the issues to do with autonomy, freedom and
distributive justice while still allowing for the generation of economic benefits (see section 5D).
For these reasons, I consider defining data in terms of property to be a more nuanced response.
The view of data as property is responsive to the harms from surveillance capitalism, while
allowing potential economic benefits from selective marketing practices to thrive.
There may be critics who remain unconvinced by the property approach because of the
normative implications that accompany declaring data property. For instance, though I have
addressed the transnational recognition of private property through Piketty’s view, a skeptic
might remain unconvinced and assert that private property is not a universally recognized value.
This critique might argue that the concept of private property will not hold weight in collectivist
societies. A related criticism is that if property rights do necessitate the creation of an entirely
new market for the buying and selling of personal data, there may be unwanted economic
repercussions. In response to this broad class of objections that object to the universality of
property or the manifestations of a property framework, I propose that property rights need not
exist in a vacuum.
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Property rights could simply be another tool at the human rights level wielded to
mitigate the harms of surveillance capitalism. My earlier discussion of the limitations of existing
privacy laws becomes relevant here: as previously argued, the current regime, as it exists, is not
robust enough. This paper develops an argument for a novel solution that could address the
previously stated harms of surveillance capitalism, but perhaps this solution is to be used in
conjunction with bolstered privacy laws to completely eradicate the harms. Essentially, by
arguing for the limitations of current privacy law or potential privacy laws, I do not mean to
undermine the efficacy of privacy in the data sphere altogether. Instead, I hope to open an
alternative avenue that could address some of the lacunae present in existing legislative
measures.

Conclusion
Ultimately, any solution to the issue of surveillance capitalism will require a mechanism
that forces us to reconsider and realize the true value of personal data. As such, the solution
might lie in an institution that humans have held in high regard for centuries. The inclusion of
property rights in conjunction with any other effective approach could address the problem from
a variety of perspectives, while ensuring a certain element of practicality. It may be unrealistic to
expect to eliminate surveillance capitalism altogether, however, we can redirect this logic of
economic accumulation by capitalizing off individuals to an end that better serves both the user
and the corporations.
In this research, I detailed how the right to individual data is pre-existing in the human
rights corpus, using the political conception of human rights to argue that the right to data fits the
general criteria for what should constitute a human right. While my analysis was largely
restricted to the works of Rawls, Beitz and Raz, further scholarship could strive for a more
67

generalized account of the right to data as a human right under this lens. Additionally, there is
potential for research into this argument from an orthodox or naturalistic perspective; this could
serve to convince detractors of the political conception by conceptualizing the right to data as an
intrinsically moral right.
My argument for why data should constitute property largely relied on my analysis of the
harms stemming from surveillance capitalism, namely, the threats to autonomy, freedom, and
distributive justice. These are broad harms meant to apply cross-culturally, however, further
insights into regional perceptions of the threats of surveillance capitalism could better inform
supranational models of protection. Moreover, this intuition could lead to a more culturally
attuned vision of data as property at the global scale. In arguing for why data should constitute
property, I also discussed possible models for implementation. Lanier and Weyl’s model is a
good starting point, but future research should focus on amalgamating both privacy and property
into a singular model to better account for the normative concerns to do with implementing
property rights. As far as solutions to surveillance capitalism go, the discussion has only begun:
progress will require interdisciplinary analysis that may originate from the philosophical domain,
but must coalesce with insights from international relations, economics, law, and business.
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